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Skirmishes between constitutional courts and supreme courts
have occurred not only in established democracies, but also in
nascent democracies and semi-authoritarian regimes. Yet this
situation has not received enough scholarly attention, despite the
widespread conflicts among domestic apex courts. Most literature
simply focuses on a single country without systematically and
comprehensively spelling out the contributing factors. Employing the
analytical framework of the game of chicken, this paper aims to fill
this academic lacuna by suggesting that: 1) information asymmetry
between apex courts is the key cause of inter-courts conflicts, and 2)
constitutional courts, isolated from the judiciary, require an alliance
with other actors to win a war of courts. The conflicts between the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in Taiwan vividly
demonstrate these points. Based on the thesis, this Article argues that
an inter-court conflict may reshape the power equilibrium between
domestic apex courts, between the judiciary and the elected branches,
and may be beneficial to society in some circumstances.
Introduction
Since the end of World War II, constitutional courts have
mushroomed around the globe, 1 and judicial review has been widely
regarded as a panacea to counter the tyranny of the majority that leads
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1 For arguments that justify the establishment of a constitutional court, see Victor Ferreres
Comella, The Rise of Specialized Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 265, 266-71 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
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to gross human rights violations. 2 This worldwide expansion of
judicial power has been accelerated by the third wave of
democratization as most nascent democracies founded during this
period have established constitutional courts to tackle politically
controversial issues. 3 Scholars maintain that democracy has gradually
become “juristocracy” 4 or “a government of judges” 5 in which judges,
instead of demos, rule. In this light, the judiciary is no longer the
least dangerous branch. 6 It becomes an institution that politicians
need to reckon with given that it has garnered the power of judicial
review and other ancillary powers of political salience. 7 Although the
judiciary possesses neither the sword nor the purse, it has deeply
intervened in the political process such that the judicialization of
politics has been commonplace all over the world. 8
Yet the judiciary is not necessarily a monolithic institution in
which there is only one apex court that monopolizes all judicial
powers. 9 Contrarily, and particularly in civil law countries, 10 there
are usually multiple apex courts, including supreme courts, supreme
2

Tom Ginsburg, The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
81, 82-87 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008); C. Neal Tate &
Torbjörn Vallinder, Judicialization and the Future of Politics and Policy, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 515, 515 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds. 1995).
OF LAW AND POLITICS

3

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY passim (1991).
4

RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 222-23 (2004).
5 See Michael H. Davis, A Government By Judges: An Historical Review, 35 AM. J. COMP.
L. 559, 562 (1987).
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 33741 (2014); Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Judicial Review: Ancillary Powers of Constitutional
Courts, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 225, 230-39 (Tom
Ginsburg & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2005); Tom Ginsburg & Zachary Elkins, Ancillary
Powers of Constitutional Courts, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1454-57 (2008) (exploring the
worldwide spread of ancillary powers).
8 See, e.g., THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder et al., eds.
2005); THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA (Björn Dressel ed., 2012).
9 See Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 44,
50-63 (2007) (discussing inter-courts conflicts in Germany, Italy, Poland, and France);
Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Building Reputation in Constitutional Courts: Political
and Judicial Audiences, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 539, 543-45 (2011) (arguing that
constitutional judges face the dilemma between policy and dispositional preferences when
facing ordinary high courts).
10 See Francisco Ramos Romeu, The Establishment of Constitutional Courts: A Study of
128 Democratic Constitutions, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 103, 118 (2006) (confirming that
“countries within the
Anglo-Saxon legal heritage were 80% less likely to set up constitutional courts”).
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administrative courts, and constitutional courts. In fact, skirmishes
between constitutional courts and other high courts have occurred not
only in established democracies, such as France, Germany, 11 Italy, 12
and Belgium, but also in young democracies and semi-authoritarian
regimes, including Colombia, 13 the Czech Republic, 14 Poland, 15
Hungary, 16 Spain, 17 Romania, 18 South Korea, 19 Taiwan, 20 Thailand, 21
and Russia. 22 It is therefore plausible to assume that “[s]ystems that
divide legal authority between a constitutional court and a supreme
court face coordination problems when allocating jurisdiction and
11

See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE
118-19 (2000) (discussing the case of Lüth).
12 Carlo Guarnieri, Courts Enforcing Political Accountability, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS
163, 165-66 (Diana Kapiszewski et al eds., 2013); John Henry Merryman & Vincenzo
Vigoriti, When Courts Collide: Constitution and Cassation in Italy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L.
665, 670-81 (1966-67) (articulating a series of cases that resulted in inter-courts frictions).
13 See Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, The Judicialization of Politics in Colombia, in THE
JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 67, 89 (Rachel Sieder et al., eds., 2005).
14 See Zdeněk Kühn, Making Constitutionalism Horizontal: Three Different Central
European Strategies, in THE CONSTITUTION IN PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM 217, 222-25 (András Sajó & Renáta Uitz eds., 2005); RADOSLAV
PROCHÁZKA, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED ON FOUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN
CENTRAL EUROPE 159-65 (2002).
15 Garlicki, supra note 9, at 57-61; PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 108-13.
16 See Gabor Halmai, The Hungarian Approach to Constitutional Review, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
189, 204-07 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002); PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 136-39 (in
general, the author argues, the Hungarian Constitutional Court is “less inclined to engage
in confrontation with ordinary adjudication” than other apex courts in Central and Eastern
Europe).
17 See Victor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 174, 183-88 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds.,
2009); Mugambi Jouet, Spain's Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human
Rights Abuses in Latin America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 495, 497
(2007); STONE SWEET, supra note 11, at 120-21; Leslie Turano, Spain: Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes?: The struggle for jurisdiction between the Tribunal Constitutional and the
Tribunal Supremo, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 151, 160-62 (2006).
18 See Renate Weber, The Romanian Constitutional Court: In Search of Its Own Identity, in
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
283, 298-303 (Wojciech Sadurski ed. 2002).
19 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
ASIAN CASES 239-42 (2003) (articulating the relationship between Korean Constitutional
Court and Korean Supreme Court).
20 Id. at 134-40.
21 See Bjorn Dressel, Thailand: Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary,
in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 79, 82 (Björn Dressel ed., 2012).
22 See William Burnham & Alexei Trochev, Russia's War between the Courts, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 381, 408-46 (2007) (detailing the intensified conflicts between the constitutional
court and ordinary courts); ALEXEI TROCHEV, JUDGING RUSSIA 214-20 (2008).
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resolving inconsistencies in rulings.” 23 In other words, “the presence
of tensions among the highest courts is systemic in nature.” 24
Despite the widespread conflicts among domestic apex courts,
however, this situation has not received enough scholarly attention.
Most literature simply focuses on a single country without
systematically and comprehensively spelling out the contributing
factors. In fact, nuanced differences exist between systems of judicial
review in civil law countries, and these institutional variances affect
the frequency and degree of judicial conflicts, along with other
contextual factors. This paper aims to fill this academic lacuna by
suggesting that: 1) information asymmetry between apex courts is the
major cause of inter-courts conflicts, and 2) constitutional courts,
isolated from the judiciary, require an alliance with other actors to
win the war of courts.
Specifically, Section I surveys why disagreements between
apex courts occur after the proliferation of constitutional courts,
suggesting that institutional design and ideational differences are the
two major reasons that lead to disagreements. However, not all
disagreements escalate to open conflicts; such intensification thus
calls for further explanation. Adopting a basic analytical framework
based on the notion of “a game of chicken,” Section II indicates that
most inter-courts confrontations take place when both courts choose
not to yield because of information asymmetry. Once a war of courts
emerges, which court prevails (in the sense that its legal interpretation
persists after conflict) is determined not by which court has better
legal interpretation but by which court has stronger alliances. Hence,
Section III further investigates the alignment between courts and
other political actors in these confrontations that may result in the
shift of power equilibrium among all three branches. Section IV
examines the inter-courts conflicts in Taiwan, endeavoring to
demonstrate that information asymmetry does lead to wars of courts.
Section V proposes several normative implications, followed by the
Conclusion.

23

Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Courts, 3
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 49, 59 (2002) (pointing out that judges of ordinary courts
were “trained, selected, and promoted under the [authoritarian] regime”).
24 Garlicki, supra note 9, at 63.
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I.

Origins of Judicial Disagreements

With the establishment of constitutional courts around the
globe in recent decades, inter-courts conflicts have emerged
accordingly so much so that “[c]onstitutional court judges lament that
their judgments are not enforced because of resistance and sabotage
from the rest of the judiciary. But ordinary judges complain that
constitutional courts routinely usurp the function of judicial review
of legislation and intrude in the traditional domain of the regular
judiciary.” 25 Some may argue this is nothing more than a storm in a
teacup. Nevertheless, the skirmishes between apex courts are so
intense that they have infringed upon human rights and spawned
political gridlock. This presents a puzzle: why do judicial
disagreements occur so often if there is a “right answer” 26 in most
cases as noted by Dworkin? Two factors—institutional design and
ideational divergence—may account for the disagreements between
apex courts, particularly between a constitutional court and a supreme
court.
A. Institutional Design
Institutional design of the judiciary affects not only whether,
but also how, inter-courts conflicts occur. Three aspects of judicial
institutions are particularly crucial: the composition of constitutional
courts, their accessibility, and the scope of jurisdiction.
First, the personnel composition of constitutional courts may
suggest the relationship between apex courts. Specifically, three
major appointment models—representation, cooperation, and singlebody appointment—lead to three types of personnel composition of
constitutional courts. In the representation model, all three
constitutional branches appoint justices to the bench. That is to say,
one-third of constitutional judges are appointed by supreme courts
and can be seen as their allies or agents in constitutional courts.
Hence, inter-courts skirmishes are less likely to materialize, since
heterogeneous interests and viewpoints from different courts will be
fully discussed and negotiations can be made before a decision is
rendered. As a corollary, constitutional decisions tend to be more
moderate and a collegial relationship between high courts is more
25
26

TROCHEV, supra note 22, at 266.
See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985).
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likely to be forged. 27 Countries that have adopted this model include
Italy, 28 South Korea, 29 and Indonesia. 30 The cooperation model refers
to the appointment system whereby the executive nominates all
constitutional judges who are then confirmed by the legislature. Both
the Czech Republic 31 and Taiwan reflect this model. Without direct
participation in the decision-making process, it is difficult for
supreme courts to defend their interests and positions during the
process of constitutional decision-making. Mutual trust between
apex courts can thus be fragile, and inter-courts tension is more likely
to emerge. Finally, in the single-body appointment model,
constitutional judges are usually appointed exclusively by the
legislature without the intervention of other branches.
The
paradigmatic example is Germany. Theoretically, judges nominated
this way are likely to share viewpoints akin to those of their
appointers. It will not be surprising that constitutional courts may
deviate from, if not run directly counter to, supreme courts in
constitutional controversies.
Institutionally, the representation model is most likely to
internalize inter-court disagreements by directly including career
judges in constitutional courts. By contrast, both the cooperation and
single-body appointment models lack the formal inclusion of
supreme courts in the appointment process, a design that results in
limited mutual understanding between apex courts, which is crucial
in avoiding head-on confrontations. Nonetheless, it should be noted
that politicians often consult or voluntarily nominate judges from

27

See CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 121-24 (2003); CASS SUNSTEIN,
GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 8-12 (2009).
28 Tania Groppi, The Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a Multilevel System of
Constitutional Review? in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 125, 127
(Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
29 GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 220.
30 Hendrianto, Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court, in NEW
COURTS IN ASIA 158, 161 (Andrew Harding & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010)
(arguing that the “representation model” model was selected partly because then President
Megawati tried to consolidate her support by sharing the appointment power with other
political parties).
31 See Jiří Přibáň, Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: The Culture of
Constitutionalism and Human Rights in the Czech Legal System, in CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTICE EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 373, 377-78 (Wojciech
Sadurski ed. 2002) (arguing that the Czech framers adopted the American model in this
regard).
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ordinary courts to the bench for their professional credibility no
matter which model is formally adopted.
In addition to personnel composition, inter court clashes are
more likely to take place when the constitutional court is more
accessible to the judicial community and the public. The French case
stands as one good example. The Constitutional Council is rather
inaccessible, since only the two supreme courts (the Cour de
cassation and the Conseil d’État) are allowed to petition the
Constitutional Council even after the 2008 constitutional reform. 32
Neither citizens nor judges from lower courts are eligible to file
petitions for constitutional review. 33 Because cases are filtered by the
supreme courts in advance, the Constitutional Council can only
access cases with the approval of supreme courts. Accordingly, the
number of cases is small, the space for disagreement is procedurally
circumscribed, and fierce confrontations are relatively few and far
between. Moving along the spectrum of accessibility, constitutional
courts in Italy, Korea, and Taiwan are more accessible than their
French counterpart. Judges in lower courts may file petitions directly
so long as the law in question poses a constitutional issue. This
design opens the channel for judges of lower courts to challenge
precedents or legal interpretations made by their superiors before
constitutional judges, a channel that has led to several disagreements
between apex courts. Finally, constitutional complaints result in
inter-courts conflicts most directly and frequently. For one thing,
allowing citizens to petition constitutional courts inevitably enhances
the number of cases and raises the possibilities of inter-court
disagreement. For another, cases brought by citizens usually
challenge judicial decisions made by supreme courts. By hearing
constitutional complaints, constitutional courts pose a direct
challenge to supreme courts and essentially position themselves as
“super supreme courts” and “judges of the judge.” 34 Citizen access
also accounts for why concrete review is more likely to result in intercourts rivalry than abstract review. In abstract review, apex courts
quarrel about the law, not the decision itself. Hence, it is the
legislature, not supreme courts, that is directly subject to
32

For a detailed introduction to the Conseil Constitutionnel, see SOPHIE BOYRON, THE
CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE 150-59 (2013).
33 See Arthur Dyevre, Filtered Constitutional Review and the Reconfiguration of InterJudicial Relations, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 743-44 (2013).
34 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from
Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1684 (2004).
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constitutional scrutiny. On the other hand, concrete review allows
constitutional courts to scrutinize judicial decisions. Supreme courts
therefore encounter face-to-face inquiry since it is their own decisions
that are under review and possibly being overruled.
Last but not least, constitutional courts contradict with
supreme courts over the scope of jurisdiction. This is arguably the
most pivotal factor that affects inter-courts clashes. In theory, each
court has the final say in its own jurisdiction and there should be no
conflict. 35 This distinction works in some countries, such as Austria,
where “[t]he relationship between the three Supreme Austrian Courts
raises no particular problems, since the Federal Constitution precisely
determines the different functions of each court.” 36 In other countries,
however, the demarcation between constitutional review and legal
interpretation is opaque for at least two reasons. First, constitutional
courts often determine the constitutionality of law by dictating legal
interpretation. Namely, a law is constitutional only if it is interpreted
in a certain way. 37 This approach clearly blurs the line between
constitutional review and legal interpretation. 38 Second, in human
rights cases, the third-party effect of constitutional clauses creates “an
objective value system” in which ordinary judges must construe and
apply statutes in harmony with constitutions. 39 This provides
constitutional courts with more opportunities to intrude in the domain
of legal interpretation to make sure that constitutional harmony is
maintained.
A related point is the timing of judicial intervention. All
things being equal, ex ante judicial review creates the least amount of
conflicts between apex courts. Adopted by France 40 and Romania, 41
35

TROCHEV, supra note 22, at 268.
Anna Gamper & Francesco Palermo, The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern
Profiles of an Archetype of Constitutional Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 31, 47 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
37 See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
52-53 (2014).
38 MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
378-79 (2014).
39 Frank I. Michelman, The Interplay of Constitutional and Ordinary Jurisdiction, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 278, 289 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds.,
2011).
40 See John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative
Institutions, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
21, 32 (Wojciech Sadurski ed. 2002).
41 Weber, supra note 18, at 286-87.
36
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ex ante judicial review bites before the promulgation of a law, much
earlier than any concrete case could take place. Hence, it is unlikely
to result in inter-courts conflicts since the disagreement, if any, exists
between the constitutional court and the legislature. In contrast to the
French model, ex post judicial review occurs after a law takes effect
and is usually activated in concrete cases. Naturally, this type of
review stimulates more inter-judicial tension when apex courts
diverge on legal interpretation.
In sum, inter-courts friction is inherent in the bifurcation of
the duty of ordinary courts to apply the law and the monopoly of
constitutional courts to interpret the constitution. Since all laws must
be consistent with constitutional mandates, in practice whoever has
the power of constitutional interpretation has the final word over all
legal disputes. Insomuch as there is a disagreement between
constitutional courts and supreme courts in terms of legal
interpretation, the exercise of constitutional review is often
condemned by judges of supreme courts as a usurpation of judicial
review. 42
B. Ideational difference
Although institutional design is important in explaining the
origin of inter-courts disagreements, it is neither necessary nor
sufficient for conflicts to take place. Rather, it is merely one
condition under which disagreements may materialize. Another
pivotal factor is judicial actors themselves. Scholars have pointed out
that “the preoccupation of respective judges with their professional
stature and their concern to uphold or reinforce the status of the court
of which they are a member” contribute to the escalation of interjudiciary tension. 43 Both constitutional and supreme courts would
like to expand their own power at the expense of the other. This
tendency of self-aggrandizement results mainly from the ideational
differences between judges of different apex courts even though they
are all called “judges.” Specifically, three ideational elements—
professional background, judicial audience, and the raison d'être of
constitutional courts—motivate courts to stand up for the fight.
First, judges in constitutional courts and supreme courts
usually have distinctive professional backgrounds and perceptions of
42
43

See Kühn, supra note 14, at 222-35.
VISSER supra note 38, at 377.
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themselves.
The former tends to be political, active, and
individualistic, whereas the latter perceive themselves to be passive,
collective, and apolitical appliers of the law.
In general,
constitutional judges tend to be prominent scholars or lawyers who
have close ties with politicians before they serve on the bench. When
interpreting constitutions, they usually need to create new laws
substantively to flesh out the constitutional norms. By contrast,
ordinary judges in civil law countries are expected to be faceless
bureaucrats operating in a narrow, technical, and even ossified way. 44
They decide cases by mechanically applying the laws enacted by the
legislature. To them, professionalism is equivalent to being apolitical.
This ideology is reinforced and reproduced by state examinations,
vocational training, and hierarchical control by judges of higher
echelons. 45 After entering the system, most ordinary judges are
socialized to be conservative and passive, while those who resist such
socialization are marginalized, if not disciplined. 46 The Chilean case
is a good example in which hierarchal control and apoliticism
contribute to the reluctance of the Chilean Supreme Court to be
proactive in the protection of human rights even after
democratization. 47 This divergence of professional backgrounds
inevitably creates tension between apex courts.
Second, the audiences with which the two apex courts seek to
engage are somewhat different. This attitudinal distinction has been
identified in the past two decades: constitutional courts seem to have
a global mindset, whereas supreme courts mostly focus on the
domestic legal community. 48 Empirical studies show that, among civil
law countries, career judges tend to cite fewer foreign decisions and
44 JOHN

HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE 34-38 (2007).
45 See Neil Chisholm, The Diffusion of American Judicial Independence Ideology into
Taiwan and South Korea, 5 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 204, 206 (2013) (arguing that this
is one way to secure judicial independence).
46 LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS
FROM CHILE 173-74 (2007).
47 See Javier Couso & Lisa Hilbink, From Quietism to Incipient Activism: The Institutional
and Ideological Roots of Rights Adjudication in Chile, in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 99,
101-05 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-Figueroa eds., 2011); HILBINK, supra note 46, at
224-28 (arguing that hierarchal control and apoliticism discouraged judges from defending
human rights and rule of law).
48 See VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 71-102
(2013); Cheryl Saunders, Judicial Engagement with Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 571, 571-75 (Tom Ginsburg & Tosalind Dixon eds., 2011).
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international conventions than their constitutional counterparts. 49
This finding is consistent with the educational and professional
backgrounds of different courts. 50 Career judges receive training that
leads them to deduce “from a written, legislated text as the source of
the general law,” and thus reasoning is “formal, legalistic and
magisterial in tone.” 51 Judicial dialogue is neither emphasized nor
encouraged by conventional legal training. By contrast, “these
features of civilian judicial reasoning are less pronounced in
constitutional adjudication.” 52 Constitutional judges are asked to
illuminate the vagueness of constitutional texts; hence, innovation
and flexibility are both necessary virtues in constitutional review.
Also it is not uncommon that they were academics or lawyers before
being promoted, who are more likely to be open-minded, actively
engaging comparable international and foreign experiences in
reasoning, and less constrained by domestic judicial precedents.
This attitudinal divergence may intensify inter-courts tensions
in two ways. Firstly, the audience the court tries to engage with
reflects “[the] court’s position and how it views its role with respect
to sociopolitical struggles over the polity’s collective identity.” 53 For
example, in Korea, “[w]hile the Supreme Court appears to follow its
notoriously conservative Japanese counterpart, the Constitutional
Court appears to model itself on its activist counterparts in Germany
and the United States.” 54 Secondly, domestic judges are not
necessarily bound by foreign case law. It follows that constitutional
decisions predicating legal reasoning on foreign case law might be
called into question by other courts as ungrounded. For example, the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court faced just such a controversy in
Interpretation No. 582 in which it referenced a number of
49

See Wen-Chen Chang & Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Judges as Discursive Agent, in THE USE OF
FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 373, 382-83 (Tania Groppi & MarieClaire Ponthoreau eds., 2013); Akiko Ejima, A Gap between the Apparent and Hidden
Attitudes of the Supreme Court of Japan towards Foreign Precedents, in THE USE OF
FOREIGN PRECEDENTS BY CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES 273, 382-83 (Tania Groppi & MarieClaire Ponthoreau eds., 2013) (pointing out that “the Supreme Court of Japan is not
interested in foreign case law”).
50 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 44, at 35.
51 Saunders, supra note 48, at 578.
52 Id.
53 RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (2014).
54 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 241-42 (arguing that in Korea, judges of ordinary
courts, trained domestically, have different vision than their counterparts in constitutional
courts).
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international treaties, including the ECHR and ICCPR. 55 Citing these
international covenants, the Constitutional Court struck down two
precedents issued by the Taiwanese Supreme Court, resulting in the
most intense contention between the two courts. 56 Ironically,
constitutional courts cite international and foreign laws in order to
justify their decisions and facilitate dialogue, yet ordinary courts are
not able to digest the message and in turn challenge the legitimacy
and validity of the decisions. Judicial engagement invites contention
rather than pacifying it.
Finally, the establishment of constitutional courts itself is a
byproduct of political struggle and compromise. In countries such as
Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, 57 constitutional courts are founded to
meet politicians’ needs, be they buying political insurance or
lowering the cost of democratic transition. That is to say, from the
very beginning, the birth of constitutional courts and the staffing of
justices have strong political overtones in addition to protecting
human rights and restoring rule of law. Moreover, the trend of
judicialization of politics in the past two decades has significantly
expanded the power of constitutional courts.58 It not only shifts the
equilibrium between the political and judicial branches but also
occurs at the expense of supreme courts. To illustrate, many powers
of political salience, such as the powers to dissolve political parties,
to impeach the presidents, and to oversee elections are granted to
constitutional courts instead of supreme courts. 59 In fact, supreme
courts used to monopolize the power of judicial review, yet now the
power is shared by, if not completely transferred to, constitutional
courts. 60 The power redistribution between the Korean Supreme
Court and the Korean Constitutional Court before and after
democratization is the best example. 61 In short, the political nature of
55 J.Y. Interpretation No. 582 (2004), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=582.
56 Id.
57 See Bjorn Dressel, Thailand: Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary,
in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN ASIA 79, 82 (2014); Andrew Harding & Peter
Leyland, The Constitutional Courts of Thailand and Indonesia, in CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 317, 319-23 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds.,
2009).
58 C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power? in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 28-30 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjörn Vallinder eds. 1995).
59 See CHANG ET AL., supra note 7, at 337-41; Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 230-39.
60 See Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 7, at 1434.
61 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 208-17.
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a constitutional court has strong implications for confrontation with
the supreme courts.
As a result, the establishment of constitutional courts has been
opposed by supreme courts very early on in some countries, 62 since
the raison d'être of creating a new constitutional tribunal reflects
precisely the distrust towards the original judiciary headed by a
supreme court. 63 Most constitutional courts are established after the
authoritarian period during which supreme courts are deferential to
the political branches and impotent in maintaining rule of law. What
is worse, they sometimes serve as the paws and claws of strongmen
legitimizing totalitarian reign. This subservient image seriously
damages the reputation of supreme courts as an independent and
capable institution to eradicate gross human rights violations, check
and balance political branches, and protect fundamental rights.
Consequently, most constitutional courts enjoy higher reputations
than supreme courts during the post-transition period. From this
perspective, the hostilities between constitutional courts and supreme
courts are inherent in many dual systems that have both apex courts.
Constitutional judges see their counterparts in supreme courts as
conservative and outdated while supreme courts find constitutional
courts overly assertive and intrusive. 64
C. Summary
Admittedly, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” 65 In the civil law context,
nonetheless, this truism does not tell who exactly has the final say
over what the law is in the judicial department. From the previous
discussion, both the institutional design of constitutional courts and
62

See Andrew Hardin, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, 1998-2006, in NEW COURTS
121, 127 (Andrew Hardin & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010).
63 See Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 40, at 32; Andrew Hardin et al., Constitutional
Courts: Forms Functions, and Practice in Comparative Perspective, in CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 11-15 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009);
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE 23 (2000). For a somewhat different explanation of the emergence of
constitutional adjudication in CEE, see Kasia Lach & Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional
Courts of Central and Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 52, 59-61 (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009); Michelman, supra note
39, at 281.
64 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 21 (2005).
65 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
IN ASIA
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the ideational perception of constitutional judges vary greatly from
that of supreme courts and ordinary judges. Institutionally,
constitutional courts have carved out distinctive jurisdiction and
become accessible and powerful at the expense of supreme courts in
the last three decades. Ideationally, constitutional judges are
appointed by political branches if not popularly elected and
undoubtedly have different and even antithetical views about the
law. 66 These structural and ideological divergences have resulted in
tensions between apex courts.
However, not all disagreements between apex courts escalate
into a war of courts. Any open inter-courts conflict is so costly to
both apex courts that they will choose to negotiate and compromise
in most scenarios. The question of when disagreements will escalate
into head-on conflicts presents itself as a new puzzle that needs to be
solved.
I.

When do Open Conflicts Occur

Although disagreements between apex courts are not
uncommon, a war of courts does not seem to be an everyday
phenomenon. Judges on both sides are rational actors who calculate
the costs and benefits before taking any actions and are unlikely to
initiate open conflicts actively since confrontation between apex
courts is costly. 67 This being the case, either constitutional courts or
supreme courts tend to compromise in most scenarios where there is
a judicial disagreement. Given this, it is worth exploring why both
apex courts sometimes, but not always, insist on confronting with
each other at the expense of their own institutional reputations and
social order. Consideration of the game of chicken and of costbenefit analysis suggests that information asymmetry between apex
courts may be crucial. 68

66

In Bolivia, for instance, judges of constitutional courts are popularly elected after 2009.
See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25-63 (2013); RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 57-77 (2008); but see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 52-59 (2006) (arguing that Posner’s
pragmatism focuses too much “on the viewpoint of judges rather than on the overall design
of the interpretive system”).
68 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991, 1004-05, 1024-30 (2008) (using similar approaches to explain inter-branch conflicts).
67
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A. The Game of Chicken
Through the lens of game theory, constitutional courts and
supreme courts are actually playing the game of chicken when
competing for supremacy. 69 Suppose a petitioner challenges a legal
interpretation issued by a supreme court in front of a constitutional
court. When the constitutional court agrees with the petitioner on the
merits, both courts have two options: the constitutional court may
choose to uphold the decision of the supreme court based on other
reasons (i.e., C.C. swerves) or quash it (C.C. does not swerve).
Similarly, the supreme court may choose to accept the constitutional
interpretation (S.C. swerves) or resist it (S.C. does not swerve).
Table 1: The Game of Chicken between Apex Courts 70

Payoff
(CC, SC)
C.C.
swerves

C.C.
not swerve

of

S.C. swerves

S.C. does
not swerve
(1)
(2)
(status quo)
(loss
of
(0, 0)
public
support,
institutional
prestige et. al)
(-25, 50)
does
(3)
(4)
(institutional
(loss
of
prestige et. al, loss of public support &
jurisdiction)
judicial chaos for
(50, -25)
both courts)
(-50, -50)

Although each court has two options, they do not choose
strategies randomly but do so partly in response to the other’s strategy.
To begin with, the constitutional court would not “swerve” when it
believes the supreme court will choose to succumb (Cell (3)) because
the constitutional court wins two major benefits in this circumstance:
institutional prestige and public approval. When the constitutional
court strikes down supreme court decisions, its status as the guardian
of the constitution is further entrenched. This is particularly
69

For an introduction of the game of chicken, see, for example, ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES
70-71 (2007).
70 This figure is adapted from MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI PUBLIC CHOICE
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
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important in new democracies where the constitutional court needs to
establish its authority. Moreover, public approval is another good
which constitutional judges long for. 71 For one thing, constitutional
judges are often political appointees whose recognition hinges in part
on public support, which is particularly crucial in accumulating
political capital. The more popular a court, the more effectively it
may implement its decisions, check coordinate branches, and most
importantly, expand its power. In sum, given the potential benefits
the constitutional court may garner if it wins a battle of courts, it has
strong incentives to stand firm when it knows the supreme court
would swerve.
Conversely, the constitutional court is likely to compromise
when the supreme court insists on and is determined to defend its
legal interpretation (Cell (2)). Supreme courts do have strong
incentives to defend their legal interpretations in order to sustain legal
stability and strengthen their authority in the domains of civil and
criminal law. Even though the doctrine of stare decisis is not
formally recognized in civil law countries, precedents made by
supreme courts are equivalent to de facto law. In other words,
supreme courts maintain their supremacy in the realm of civil and
criminal law by wielding the power to issue precedents and thus have
strong incentives to push back when legal interpretations are
challenged by constitutional courts. Also, change of widely accepted
precedents affects current practice by lower courts since numerous
cases on trial have to adjust. This adds the burden to supreme courts,
and increases their willingness to resist constitutional courts. In
circumstances where such determination is firm and observable,
constitutional courts are likely to give in since the two major benefits
mentioned above—institutional prestige and public approval—are
uncertain if supreme courts refuse to collaborate.
Cells (2) and (3) are Nash equilibria in the game of chicken
between apex courts: one court goes straight and the other swerves to
prevent the worst scenario (Cell (4)). The analysis implies that intercourts conflicts might be completely avoided if each court were to
have perfect information of the other’s strategy. If constitutional
courts know in advance that supreme courts will definitely reject their
interpretations, they are unlikely to be overly assertive and will soften
their positions, since resistance from supreme courts certainly raise
71

Id. at 59.
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the cost of constitutional decisions. Likewise, if supreme courts
know beforehand that their decisions will not survive the gauntlet of
constitutional review, they may take this into account and revise their
opinions accordingly. This explanation is also consistent with the
inference discussed in representation model—since constitutional
courts include representatives from supreme courts, the two courts
are more likely to share mutual understandings and less likely to cross
lines.
In the real world, however, the information is almost always
asymmetric. Both courts may miscalculate the potential costs to them
and shy away from confrontation. In Cell (1), both courts choose to
compromise rather than fight.
Constitutional courts may
conditionally uphold a decision even though they find it
constitutionally dubious and supreme courts have little reason to
revolt since their decision is maintained. In this scenario, neither the
constitutional court nor the supreme court receives any benefit.
On the other hand, mutual miscalculation could lead to more
disastrous situations when both courts wrongly assume that the other
will swerve. Cell (4) refers to the scenario in which constitutional
courts quash supreme courts’ decisions and the latter decides to resist
publicly. This is the worst scenario because both apex courts gain no
benefit and bear costs, at least in the short term. For the constitutional
court, the costs include the non-compliance of supreme courts and,
more importantly, the loss of public approval. Compliance with
decisions is always a serious concern of the judiciary due to its lack
of the sword and the purse. Lacking mechanisms for sanctioning and
monitoring, constitutional courts face greater challenge to ensuring
adherence than do supreme courts, which may exercise hierarchical
control over lower courts. Ordinary judges who disagree with
constitutional courts can easily abuse their discretion to delay
implementation, or even blatantly ignore them. Even the U.S.
Supreme Court has to rely on other branches for implementation; 72 to
say nothing of other constitutional courts that face both external
political obstacles and internal judicial barriers. When decisions are
repeatedly disobeyed, the authority of constitutional courts wanes.
The disobedience of the political branches further discourages lower
courts from conforming, and a vicious cycle that is detrimental to
compliance with constitutional decisions thus emerges. From this
72 GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 88-91 (2008) (articulating the resistance of
state courts in the American context during the civil rights movement).
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perspective, non-compliance affects, and at the same time reflects,
the authority of constitutional courts.
Inter-court conflicts not only damage the authority of both
constitutional and supreme courts but also result in the ebb of public
approval for several reasons. First, inter-courts frictions usually
render the judiciary chaotic and lead to rights infringement. This is
particularly evident in the domain of criminal law because human
rights violations are particularly gross in this field during
authoritarian periods and these violations are legitimized by supreme
courts that are submissive to dictators. It is therefore understandable
why constitutional courts would target criminal law, and why
resistance from supreme courts is rampant in this regard. As both
sides have interests at stake, disagreement (or the following
confrontation) is likely to aggravate rights violations. Second, intercourts conflicts reveal the fact that there is no single correct answer
to every legal question, and judges are essentially legislating rather
than adjudicating under these circumstances. It follows that, more
fundamentally, judges can be as political as politicians that prioritize
personal ideologies, interests, and preferences. This can be
detrimental to both courts, since judicial authority and supremacy is
built upon the façade of judicial neutrality and disinterestedness. 73
That is, inter-court frictions manifest the fact that judges can
sometimes be politicians in robes. In a word, inter-courts
confrontation serves no good to either party. Given that both courts
are presumed to be rational, it is plausible to argue that such open
conflict only takes place when both courts underestimate the other’s
determination to defend its own stance.
Some may argue that inter-courts conflicts are not necessarily
the worst scenario that both courts would try to avoid. Both sides
might still attack each other even if they know the other party would
not yield, and thus lack of mutual understanding is not the key link
between disagreement and open conflict.
For example, a
“constitutional showdown” may provide long-term benefits by
setting precedents and reducing decision and transaction costs in the
future. 74 That is, the cost-benefit analysis mentioned above is too
narrow and considers only institutional benefits but not social welfare
73

See JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS
7-10 (2009) (explaining the idea of positivity bias).
74 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1010-11(discussing-branch conflicts).
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as a whole. It is reasonable to assume that the long-term interests will
outweigh the short-term costs led by such conflicts.
Furthermore, it could also be argued that the above game-ofchicken analysis does not take into account judges’ personal stakes,
which may incentivize them to disregard institutional interests. That
is, a constitutional court is a “they,” not an “it” and faces collective
action problems. 75 As a corollary, “even if some particular approach
to constitutional judging is best for all judges, it does not follow that
it would be best for any given judge.” 76 For example, constitutional
judges in most civil law countries do not enjoy life tenure, 77 which is
guaranteed only to career judges in ordinary courts. In other words,
constitutional judges need to find a job after stepping down. 78 The
argument goes that constitutional court judges are likely to pursue
personal reputations or dispositional preferences 79 rather than
institutional interests and are willing to wage a war even if this leads
to the worst-case scenario that harms the institution. 80 By contrast,
with life tenure, judges of supreme courts may value collegial
friendship more and be less assertive than their counterparts in
constitutional courts. 81
These critiques are reasonable, but it is unclear to what extent,
if any, judges of apex courts prioritize, or at least consider, social
welfare before making any decisions. 82 Also, unlike politicians who
are accountable to the electorate, “[b]ecause judges gain nothing for
themselves by advancing good policy as they perceive it, their
incentives to pursue this goal are not overwhelming.” 83 To be sure,
the long-term benefits of inter-courts conflicts may outweigh its
short-term costs from the perspective of the whole society—an issue
that will be covered later. What this paper suggests here, however, is
75 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 246-48 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, The
Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 554-63 (2005).
76 ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 134 (2011).
77 Austria and Belgium are two notable exceptions.
78 See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY 24 (2000) (arguing that
“career choices after one’s service is completed introduces a measure of self-interest”)
(emphasis omitted).
79 Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 544.
80 Of course, given that many constitutional courts require a supermajority of vote to issue
decisions, whether, or how often, this strategy will succeed is another intriguing issue.
81 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 42-43 (2013) (arguing that
judges try to avoid the ill will of one’s colleagues by refraining from dissenting).
82 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 68, at 1025.
83 LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 50 (2006).
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not whether inter-courts conflicts should be encouraged normatively,
but when inter-courts conflicts will emerge in practice. Moreover,
compared to inter-branch constitutional showdowns, the scale and
impact of inter-court frictions are usually more moderate. It follows
that the long-term benefits caused by such conflicts are more
uncertain.
As to the self-interest problem, it has been ameliorated or at
least lessened, through institutional design.
For one, some
constitutional courts adopt a consensual approach during the process
of decision-making and prohibit personal opinions, preserving the
prestige and undergirding the authority of their decisions. 84 For
another, constitutional courts usually require a majority of votes to
deliver any decisions. The threshold may effectively render the
stance of the moderate (usually the median or swing justice) more
likely to prevail. 85 Therefore, the drive of personal interests may not
change the fundamental logic of the game of chicken between the two
courts.
B. Factors that Facilitate Prediction
Given that inter-court conflicts result from miscalculation, it
is necessary to understand how a court predicts the other’s strategy as
to prevent head-on clashes under normal circumstances. Several
factors may help both courts better estimate the strategy of their
counterpart: the composition of constitutional courts, legal stability,
the type of disagreements, and social ties.
First, the composition of constitutional courts is the most
effective way constitutional judges may predict the reaction of their
counterparts in supreme courts. As mentioned earlier, there are three
main appointment systems of constitutional courts.
In the
representation model, one-third of constitutional judges are appointed
by supreme courts without the intervention of other branches. These
former supreme court judges serve as reference points that allows
other constitutional judges to be able to predict the stance of supreme
courts. Of course, a supreme court is also a “they” not an “it,” and
the opinions of some of its former members certainly do not represent
84

See VOLCANSEK, supra note 78, at 26-27.
See THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT 95-138 (2005).
85

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/3

314

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

the court as a whole. But they do at least provide some information.
Note this does not imply constitutional courts that adopt different
appointment models are unable to predict the behavior of their
counterparts. No matter which model is formally adopted, there are
usually some seats substantively reserved for career judges, and the
appointers will consult supreme courts before nominating. The more
diversified the composition of a constitutional court, the more easily
it may predict the action of different actors.
Second, the potential impact of a decision on legal stability is
also an indicator which constitutional courts may use to predict how
supreme courts might react. As mentioned earlier, legal stability is
particularly important to supreme courts, which have the final say
over all civil, criminal, and administrative controversies. Any attack
against precedent not only destabilizes legal order but also challenges
the authority of supreme courts in these domains. Nonetheless, not
all precedents are treated alike. Inter-court frictions are more likely
to emerge when a precedent declared unconstitutional and void has
remained valid for a longer period of time. From a normative
perspective, supreme courts would reasonably expect that a wellestablished precedent should be more constitutionally sustainable.
From a pragmatic angle, change of a widely accepted precedent
increases the burden on supreme courts since it affects numerous
cases currently on trial in ordinary courts. Therefore, constitutional
courts should be more cautious when they quash a precedent that has
long been in effect.
Moreover, the type of disagreement also influences how
supreme courts will react. Theoretically, supreme courts will react
more strongly when it is their decisions, rather than statutes, that are
overruled. This explains why concrete review is more provocative
than abstract review in the eyes of supreme courts. In abstract review,
technically it is the statute that is questioned, not the judicial decision
itself, even though there are disagreements about how the law should
be interpreted. In other words, it is the legislature, instead of supreme
courts, that is directly at war with constitutional courts. By contrast,
in concrete review, constitutional courts directly challenge, and
actually diminish, the authority of supreme courts when striking
down their decisions. Unsurprisingly, this will lead to head-on
collisions more easily.
Last but not least, judges of both courts, however
professionally trained, are still part of society and will inevitably be
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susceptible to the social climate. 86 This common background may
render them more able to know what the other would rule under
certain circumstances. In a conservative society, for instance, it
would be inconceivable for constitutional courts to strike down
judicial precedents that prohibit gay marriage. The judiciary, albeit
not popularly elected, is majoritarian more often than not.
C. Summary
Section I identifies a plethora of elements that may result in
judicial disagreement, but these factors cannot explain why intercourt conflicts occur in some countries but not in others that share
similar institutional and ideational characteristics. They also fail to
elucidate when skirmishes will emerge. To further clarify these
conundrums, this section applies a basic model of the game of
chicken, suggesting that open confrontations take place when both
apex courts wrongly believe the other would succumb and choose to
go charge ahead. Once an inter-court conflict emerges, the next
question becomes what strategies courts will choose. Anecdotal
evidence has shown that constitutional courts have often prevailed in
a war of courts. Given that they are established outside the judiciary,
constitutional courts may forge coalitions with other political actors
when asserting jurisdiction. 87 This is usually followed by escalated
tension between apex courts.
II. Alliances with other Actors
Although inter-court conflicts do not happen frequently, they
usually become the focal point in the political arena since a war
between high courts can hardly be a pure judicial issue. Such
contentions very often result from the materialization of frictions and
the re-alignment of major political agents. In a forward-looking
fashion, the redistribution of judicial power has impact on different
government organs, political parties, and other potential actors. This
is because change in the judiciary reshapes the framework in which
power struggles take place, particularly in an era of global
86

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 293 (2014).
See John Ferejohn, Judicial Power: Getting it and Keeping it, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURT
349, 360 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013).
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judicialization of politics where most political conflicts are
eventually solved in courtrooms. 88 Hence, it is crucial to investigate
the alignment among courts, other political institutions, and key
stakeholders in order to understand the new political dynamics that
have emerged from inter-court conflicts.
Moreover, once a clash takes place, which court will prevail
does not usually depend on whose legal interpretation is better but
rather on who can successfully forge an alliance with other actors.
Therefore, constitutional courts and supreme courts are respectively
incentivized to ally with different political actors such as citizens,
lower courts, and politicians. From the perspective of the
constitutional court, both institutional disadvantage and legitimacy
crises strongly motivate it to ally with all three actors. Structurally,
constitutional courts are dependent on other institutions to initiate
constitutional review and implement their decisions since
constitutional courts lack control of both the lower courts as well as
the political branches. 89 Also, since constitutional courts are created
outside the conventional judicial system, their legitimacy is built
more on recognition from their audience, particularly the general
public. Compared to supreme courts, therefore, constitutional courts
are more likely to rule in line with mainstream doctrines and ally
themselves with citizens (or public opinion leaders in some cases).
In a word, constitutional courts may ally with politicians, lower courts,
or citizens, depending on the context. As for supreme courts, the
alliance is often with politicians. In Poland, for example, the new
Constitution of 1997 provides more textual munitions for the Polish
Supreme Court to defy the Constitutional Court. 90 On a conceptual
level, supreme courts are unlikely to ally with the public in a war of
courts since there would be no case to start with if a supreme court
agrees with citizens.

88

See Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts,
11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 93, 99-112 (2008) (introducing several illustrative cases of
judicialization of politics); Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v.
Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 191, 191-211 (2002).
89 But see SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 8-9 (pointing out that constitutional courts can act
sua sponte in Albania, Hungary, Montenegro, Poland before 1997, Russia before 1994, and
Serbia).
90 PROCHÁZKA, supra note 14, at 110-11.
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A. Alliance with Citizens
The phenomenon of alliances between constitutional courts
and citizens is widely observed when the former clashes with
supreme courts. Specifically, three major channels facilitate such
alignment.
First, in some Eastern European states, citizens may “initiate
abstract review regardless of whether they have specific legal
interests in the case in question” 91 through an institution called actio
popularis. 92 In Hungary, where even non-citizens can lodge such suit,
this approach has been widely used to invalidate the death penalty
and protect free speech. 93 Since citizens may directly challenge the
constitutionality of a law without a concrete controversy, the conflict
between apex courts is least likely to happen through this channel.
Second, citizens may petition constitutional courts when their
constitutional rights are infringed after exhausting all available
judicial remedies. In countries like Taiwan and Poland, it is statutes,
rather than judicial decisions, that are subject to constitutional review.
This is usually categorized as abstract review, a compromised version
of constitutional complaint situated between the first and third types.
Although judicial decisions are not directly challenged in this
scenario, inter-court confrontations sometimes take place when apex
courts disagree with how statutes should be interpreted. Finally, the
last category comprises a form of constitutional complaint in which
constitutional courts may scrutinize the decisions of ordinary courts,
an institution adopted in countries like the Czech Republic, Germany,
and Russia. Since it is the constitutionality of judicial decisions that
is questioned and overruled, the conflicts between apex courts are
most acute. Essentially, constitutional courts function as special
“appellate courts” for supreme courts, or in the words of many
ordinary judges, “super supreme courts.” Despite some institutional
variances, the three channels share one crucial characteristic: it is the
citizens that challenge the constitutionality of a law or the legal
interpretation of supreme courts before constitutional courts. As a
corollary, when constitutional courts rule in favor of petitioners, the

91

SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 6.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 35. This institution has been repealed, however.
93 Id. at 81-82.
92
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triad is broken down into two against one, 94 and the alliance between
constitutional courts and citizens is thus forged.
Admittedly, some may argue that only in the German-style
constitutional complaint can we find judicial decisions being the
target of constitutional scrutiny. 95 In other jurisdictions, it is the
constitutionality of statutes that is challenged. Hence, the alliance
between constitutional courts and citizens emerges only in the third
category.
This claim is technically correct but analytically
misleading. Inter-court clashes are possible in all three categories
when constitutional courts rule in favor of citizens, even when
constitutional courts do not review concrete decisions. By striking
down the statue from which supreme courts derive legal
interpretation, constitutional courts practically compel supreme
courts to change their original ruling. The interaction between the
Italian Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation in 1965 shall
demonstrate this point. The Italian Court of Cassation rendered a
decision on procedural issues related to “summary investigation” in
1958, ruling that some fair-trial guarantees are not fully required in
this type of proceeding. In February 1965, the Constitutional Court
was asked to review the constitutionality of provisions concerning
this issue, and required the Court of Cassation to revise its 1958
jurisprudence. 96 The Court of Cassation refused to do so; in response,
the Constitutional Court simply struck down the contested provision,
forcing the Court of Cassation to alter its original interpretation.
Simply put, striking down statutes in abstract review is
sometimes functionally equivalent to striking down decisions in the
context of inter-courts conflicts.
In both circumstances,
constitutional courts disregard the authority of supreme courts in
legal interpretation and adjudication. This analysis is also consistent
with empirical findings, since a plethora of harsh inter-court conflicts
have taken place in countries without concrete review.
In addition, constitutional courts can further consolidate the
alliance by ruling in favor of (the majority of) citizens. In fact,
judicial accessibility usually triggers a self-empowering circle: the
more accessible a constitutional court is, the more opportunities it has
to rule in favor of the public; the more popular it is, the more
94

See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 2 (1981).
See Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 102, 112-13 (Andrew Hardin & Peter
Leyland eds., 2009).
96 Merryman & Vigoriti, supra note 12, at 670-75. Garlicki, supra note 9, at 55
95
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authoritative it becomes in rendering its mandates. 97 This is because
“[t]aking a majoritarian approach . . . ensures the greatest likelihood
of compliance.” 98 When the decisions are generally obeyed, more
people will go to constitutional courts for help, and the process
repeats itself, so on and so forth. Scholars have pointed out that
“[t]here is a clear correlation between the existence of an activist,
powerful constitutional court and the availability to citizens of a
direct constitutional complaint procedure.” 99 This may explain in part
why most constitutional courts in civil law countries are the most
trustworthy branch among the three. It is plausible to assume that
whoever stands by the public will win a war of courts.
For example, in a high profile case involving Jehovah’s
Witnesses in the Czech Republic, “the Supreme Court judges refused
to accept the ruling . . . of the Constitutional Court and virtually put
the system of justice into a deadlock.” 100 Well exposed and criticized
by the press, the Supreme Court seemed to have lost popular support,
and “the case may be perceived as a symbolic breaking point in the
‘war of the courts’ badly damaging both the public and expert
reputation of the Supreme Court.” This extra-legal pressure made the
Supreme Court eventually yield to the Constitutional Court, and
“consequently led to the acceptance of the constitutional principle of
a generally binding character of the Constitutional Court’s decision
in the human rights jurisdiction.” 101 This example vividly presents
the new political dynamics emerging from the constitutional courtcitizen alignment that shapes the power relation between the two high
courts. It may also explain why the constitutional court is deemed as
the most trustworthy of the three branches in many post-authoritarian
countries. 102
To be sure, insofar as citizens are composed of individuals
with heterogeneous interests, preferences, and ideologies, both apex
courts may claim public approval to some extent. Nonetheless, the
97 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 73-74 (calling this configuration the high equilibrium of
judicial review).
98 See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Courts in Democratization, in CONSEQUENTIAL
COURTS 45, 47 (Diana Kapiszewski et al., eds. 2013).
99 SADURSKI, supra note 64, at 8.
100 Juri Priban, Judicial Power vs. Democratic Representation: the Culture of
Constitutionalism and Human Rights in Czech Legal System, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
EAST AND WEST 373, 381 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002).
101 Id. at 381.
102 SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at 237; Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 13, at 99-100.
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degree of support for different courts not only differs but also matters
in the context of inter-court conflicts. Usually only the court with
higher popular support may successfully forge an alliance with the
public that helps it prevail in a war of courts. In many new
democracies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, constitutional courts
are more popular than supreme courts partly because of the
performance and images of the supreme courts during the
authoritarian periods. It may not be surprising that the constitutional
courts in both countries have won critical battles against the supreme
courts. In a nutshell, since public approval is pivotal to the
implementation of judicial decisions, ceteris paribus, the court with
higher public support is more likely to forge an alliance with the
people and thus prevail in an inter-court conflict.
Finally, legal experts, serving as both opinion leaders and
mobilizers, are crucial in forging the alliance between courts and
citizens and facilitating the empowering cycle. On the one hand, in
countries like France, the Czech Republic, and Taiwan, the discourse
of legal experts actually suggests the outcomes of inter-court
conflicts: whoever wins support from scholars has the upper hand in
the debate. This may result from the authority that scholars in civil
law countries enjoy in legal interpretation: legal scholars’ opinions
are highly respected by judges, politicians, and other legal
pratictioners. 103 Consequently, the court that is supported by scholars
tends to be more legitimate and authoritative, prevailing the intercourt struggle. By contrast, battles stretch out into a prolonged war
when the opinion of scholars is divided. On the other hand, legal
scholars and activist lawyers also play a leading role in public-interest
litigation, 104 organizing petitioners, and designing strategies to bring
cases to constitutional courts. In this sense, lawyers not only
strengthen the linkage between citizens and constitutional courts, but
also consolidate the power of constitutional courts. 105

103

See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 44, at 60.
Terence C. Halliday et al., Introduction: The Legal Complex in Struggling for Political
Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 1, 2 (Halliday, Karpik & Feeley eds.,
2007).
105 See Terence C. Halliday, Why the Legal Complex is Integral to Theories of
Consequential Court, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURT 337, 343-44 (Diana Kapiszewski et al.
eds., 2013); see also CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 11-25 (1998).
104
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B. Alliance with Lower Courts
Lower courts have been on both sides of the divide: alignment
between constitutional courts and lower courts is commonly observed,
while alignment between supreme courts and lower courts is also
present with strong institutional justification. As the frontline
adjudicator that takes up the most cases, lower courts manifest an
attitude that seems to signal the power dynamics within the judiciary
when they choose to conform to the will or preferences of one high
court rather than the other.
Judges from lower courts have ample reason to stand by
supreme courts when apex courts clash, as supreme courts are
institutionally advantaged to influence lower courts through the
precedent 106 and personnel policy. First, lower court judges are bound
by precedents made by their superiors in practice even though the
doctrine of stare decisis is not formally binding in civil law systems.
Judgments inconsistent with precedents are most likely to be reversed
or dismissed. This leads to the second channel through which
supreme courts exert clout over lower courts: personnel policy.
Lower court judges are evaluated for several aspects, one of which is
their reversal rate. Since conforming to precedent substantially
reduces the possibility of being reversed, lower court judges are
incentivized to follow their superiors. Second, as career judges,
lower court judges are under the hierarchical control of a system of
discipline and promotion. That is to say, judges in supreme courts
also oversee the sanction and promotion of judges in lower courts.
All the formal constraints give supreme courts an institutional
advantage to push lower courts for support. In addition, informal
pressure resulting from seniority and “face-saving” is also a common
reason for junior judges to conform to senior judges in supreme courts,
since they share the same social and professional backgrounds.
Simply put, supreme courts have disproportionate influence upon
lower courts both formally and informally.
106

Unlike precedent in a common law sense, this form of precedent is abstract legal
reasoning articulating and regulating application of formal laws, especially when a legal
element needs clarification in trial practice. The purpose of precedents is to unify different
legal opinions among different divisions in the Supreme Court in order to provide unified
standard application for lower court judges. See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra
note 44, at 36, 46-47 (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis is formally rejected, but
precedents are still influential in practice).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/3

322

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

On the other hand, lower court judges can also form a strong
alliance with constitutional courts for different reasons. First, from
the perspective of institutional design, there has been a trend that
endows lower court judges the power to file direct petitions to
constitutional courts without the screening of supreme courts. 107 This
new mechanism opens up a channel for lower court judges to seek
assistance from constitutional courts when they need to fight for
internal judicial independence. Second, ideational affinity may also
account for why lower court judges are willing to ally with
constitutional courts in inter-court conflicts, a state of affairs that
seems to be fairly prominent in many post-transition jurisdictions.
Specifically, supreme court judges in the third-wave democracies
usually enter the judicial hierarchy during the authoritarian era and
are promoted to move up the ladder because of their compliance and
deference. Conversely, judges in lower courts are usually fresh
graduates who have just left law schools and the training institute.
Though they have been taught to follow conventional doctrine and to
respect seniority, the fact that they have more exposure to the thinking
of liberal democracy and that they are not yet fully socialized into the
hierarchy differentiates them from senior judges. In this regard, they
may be ideologically closer to constitutional judges, who are usually
academics and attorneys with foreign education background before
being appointed, and are generally more liberal than their
counterparts in supreme courts. It is thus plausible that constitutional
courts and lower court judges share a perception of the role of law in
a democratic society, as opposed to the judges of supreme courts who
emphasize the legalistic view of law and hierarchical authority.
In fact, many precedents overruled by constitutional courts
are the result of petitions by lower court judges when they find the
precedents constitutionally problematic. Also, lower courts judges
may challenge the rulings of supreme courts on behalf of citizens that
have not exhausted all available remedies in some countries. When
they do so, an alignment between lower courts and constitutional
courts is thus forged, indicating a redistribution of power within the
judiciary.

107 Dyevre, supra note 33, at 743. This power is plainly stipulated in some states, such as
Italy, and granted by constitutional courts in others, such as Taiwan.
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C. Alliance with Politicians
The notion of an alliance between courts and politicians
seems counterintuitive at first glance, as conventional wisdom has
long held that the judiciary exists to check and balance the political
powers. 108 Nonetheless the relationship between the judiciary and
political branches is in reality actually more symbiotic. On the one
hand, it is in the interests of politicians to invite the judiciary to
“interpose its friendly hand” 109 when they need to legitimize policy
choices, overcome political gridlock, and shift blame. 110 On the other
hand, courts need political support to implement decisions effectively.
However persuasive their reasoning, judicial decisions are unlikely to
penetrate to the ground without the support of political power. 111
Namely, both sides have strong incentives to forge an alliance.
In cases surveyed, politicians often side with constitutional
courts, rather than supreme courts, in the context of inter-court
conflicts. This phenomenon can be analyzed both politically and
institutionally. First, in a transitional context, the creation of
constitutional courts itself is reflective of politicians’ distrust toward
supreme courts in many countries. As mentioned above, judges of
ordinary courts are usually labeled the vestiges of old regimes,
whereas constitutional courts are regarded as guardians of
constitutions in new democracies. This political reality may render
politicians in power more willing to support constitutional courts
rather than supreme courts whenever conflicts occur. Second, in
addition to human rights protections, constitutional courts are
established precisely because they can be of great help for
politicians. 112 This may also explain why politicians, be they
presidents or congressional minorities, usually have special standing
108

See Ferejohn, supra note 87, at 349-52.
See Keith E. Whittington, Interpose Your Friendly Hand: Political Supports for the
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
583, 586-93 (2005).
110 GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS 7-13 (2003); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 105-60 (2007); Stefan Voigt & Eli M.
Salzberger, Choosing not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers, 55
KYKLOS 289, 293-98 (2002).
111 See ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 94-106 (using the developments of civil rights
movement in the post-1964 United States as an example).
112 See GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 22-33 (proposing an insurance theory); RAN HIRSCHL,
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 38-49 (2004) (advancing an explanation centered on hegemonic
preservation).
109
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to petition constitutional courts directly in many countries. Third, the
appointment procedure of constitutional courts already suggests
personal relationships, shared ideology, or interests in common
between judges and politicians. By contrast, supreme court judges
are promoted based on their seniority.
This suggests that
constitutional courts have closer affinity with politicians in power.
The Conseil Constitutionel in France, for example, “is dominated by
political allies of the appointing authorities.” 113 So are the German 114
and Italian Constitutional Courts. 115 Not to mention that former
presidents of the French Republic are members of the Conseil for life.
Hence, the alliance between constitutional courts and politicians
should not be surprising. It also explains why many Kelsenian
constitutional courts have been politicized to a considerable extent. 116
Compared with the former two types of alliances, the alliance
with politicians implies more drastic change in power relations. From
the view of constitutional courts, politicians are strong allies that
ensure decision compliance, offer protection from political retaliation,
and lessen the resistance and intervention from ordinary courts.
Again, the alignment between the French Conseil Constitutionel and
the legislature is one good example. After the 2008 constitutional
reform, lower courts may seek advice from the Conseil Constitutionel
whenever they encounter constitutional questions through either the
Cour de cassation (equivalent to a supreme court) or the Conseil
d’État (supreme administrative court). The Cour de cassation was
once reluctant to send referrals to the Conseil, endeavoring to
downplay its influence and intervention. This irritated not only
constitutional law scholars but also legislators, who made it more
difficult for judges of the Cour de cassation to filter referrals. 117
Another good example is Colombia. The Colombian Constitutional
Court has frequently issued tutela 118 to protect fundamental rights
against state actions, including rulings of the Colombian Supreme
113 Ferejohn & Pasquino, supra note 34, at 33; Nuno Garoupa, The Politicization of the
Kelsenian Constitutional Courts, in EMPIRICALLY STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 149, 168
(Kuo-Chang Huang ed., 2008).
114 See Garoupa, supra note 113, at 163.
115 See VOLCANSEK, supra note 78, at 23; id. at 172.
116 See Garoupa, supra note 113, at 162-83 (articulating the politicization of constitutional
courts in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal).
117 See Dyevre, supra note 33, at 750-53.
118 In a word, tutela is a broader version of the writ of habeas corpus. For detailed
introduction of this institution, see Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The
Gender Jurisprudence of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 U. MIAMI INTERAMERICAN L. REV. 253, 276-77 (1999).
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Court. 119 This has unsurprisingly infuriated the Supreme Court,
which has fiercely denounced the institution of tutela and proposed
to weaken it. Eventually, the Constitutional Court prevailed in the
war of courts with the support of the congress by rejecting the
proposal. 120
D. Alliance with Regional Courts
Although constitutional courts are more likely to form
alliances with other actors and thus prevail in a war of courts due to
their political ties and sensitivity, this does not mean that supreme
courts are always fighting alone. Occasionally, ordinary courts will
successfully convince politicians to support them. The existence of
regional courts, such as the European Court of Justice or InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, further complicates the interaction
between supreme courts and constitutional courts in these regions.
Although the decisions of regional courts are not necessarily binding,
their legal interpretation undoubtedly provides additional
ammunition for the judicial arsenal. In fact, the existence of a
regional court provides domestic courts another chance to extend the
battle. Even though domestic constitutional courts have the final say
over constitutions, their decisions will inevitably be affected by
international and regional covenants interpreted by international and
regional courts in the era of globalization. 121 That is, domestic
ordinary courts may turn the tables with the support of regional courts.
The conflict between the German Federal Constitutional
Court and German Federal Labor Court is the best example here.
Since the late 1950s, the two courts had disagreed on the validity and
scope of the German Basic Law. 122 The German Federal Labor Court
contended that the Basic Law has direct effect (or horizontal effect),
at least in the domain of employment law. By contrast, the
Constitutional Court tends to interpret the Basic Law narrowly,
arguing it has only indirect effect. Normally, the Constitutional Court
119

See Maria Paula Saffon, Can Constitutional Courts be Counterhegemonic Powers vis-àvis Neoliberalism? The Case of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 533, 541-42 (2007).
120 See Morgan, supra note 118, at 319-23.
121 See Nancy Maveety, Comparative Judicial Studies, in EXPLORING JUDICIAL POLITICS
294, 301-02 (Mark C. Miller ed., 2009).
122 See Alec Stone Sweet & Kathleen Stranz, Rights Adjudication and Constitutional
Pluralism in Germany and Europe, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 92, 97-100 (2012).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/3

326

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

should prevail since it has the exclusive power of constitutional
review, but the decisions promulgated by the European Court of
Justice tipped the balance between the Constitutional Court and the
Labor Court in favor of the latter. 123 The German Constitutional
Court succumbed and changed its interpretation accordingly. 124
E. Summary
Institutionally, constitutional courts should be weaker than
supreme courts in a war of courts because they have no power to
discipline lower courts and ensure decision adherence. Politically,
however, constitutional courts have closer ties with political elites
and are more sensitive to public opinion. Both political ties and
public opinion are valuable resources in an inter-court conflict. In
fact, the institutional disadvantage will instead motivate
constitutional courts to ally with other actors more actively to
strengthen their power vis-à-vis supreme courts.
With the
intervention of exogenous forces, the original power equilibrium
between apex courts will unavoidably change to some extent after
inter-court conflicts.
This dynamic has occurred in many
jurisdictions, such as Taiwan, which will be discussed at length below.
III. Case Analysis: Wars of Courts in Taiwan
Similar to other civil law jurisdictions, multiple apex courts
in Taiwan enjoy supremacy in their own domains: 125 the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Administrative Court, and a special commission for civil servants.
Major disputes did also arise between the Constitutional Court and
the Supreme Court.
Unlike other constitutional courts established in the third
wave of democratization, the Taiwanese Constitutional Court was
founded during the authoritarian period in 1947, while the Nationalist
123

Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
125 For a clear illustration of the judicial structure in Taiwan, see Wen-Chen Chang, Courts
and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: Gradual Transformations Towards the Guardian of
Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS IN CONTEXT 143, 147 (Jiunn-rong
Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014); Chang-fa Lo, Taiwan: External Influences Mixed
with Traditional Elements to Form Its Unique Legal System, in LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND INNOVATIONS 91, 103-07 (E Ann
Black & Gary F. Bell eds., 2011).
124
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government was still in Mainland China. At that time, it was
deferential to the strongmen and similarly bore the stigma of being a
rubberstamp, if not the claws, of dictators. What renders it more
peculiar is that the judicial system was originally modeled on the U.S.
system in that the Judicial Yuan was to function as the final resort for
all controversies, including constitutional, civil, criminal, and
administrative issues. Due to the resistance of ordinary judges at the
founding era, however, the original idea was never implemented and
the current system in Taiwan basically reflects the German style. 126
This history has planted the seed for future inter-court conflicts.
Granted by the constitution, the Constitutional Court has the
power of abstract judicial review, yet the scope of judicial review is
not detailed in the constitution. Whether judicial precedents (PanLi) 127 issued by the Supreme Court can be scrutinized remained
nebulous for a long time. During the authoritarian period, the
Constitutional Court had expanded the scope of judicial review by
self-aggrandizement, which resulted in tension between the two
courts. First, it rendered a series of decisions to establish its authority
and legitimacy to review precedents from the two supreme courts—
the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal for civil and criminal
cases, and the Supreme Administrative Court as the final resort of
administrative cases. In Interpretation No. 154, the petitioner came
to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Administrative Court’s
precedent was unconstitutional because it denied him access to the
court. 128 The Constitutional Court created the power to scrutinize
precedents but upheld the constitutionality of the precedent to prevent
possible confrontation or disobedience, 129 a “Marbury moment” in
Taiwan. 130 After four years, the Constitutional Court used this power
again to nullify a precedent made by the Supreme Court in
Interpretation No. 177. 131 In the following years, the Constitutional
126

See Chien-Liang Lee (李建良), Dafaguan de Zhidu Biange yu Sifayuan de Xianfa
Dingwei (大法官的制度變革與司法院的憲法定位), 27 NTU L.J. 217, 237 (1998).
127 For a brief introduction of Pan-Li system, see Chang, supra note 125, at 164.
128 J.Y. Interpretation No. 154 (1978) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=154 [hereinafter
Interpretation No. 154].
129 GINSBURG, supra note 19, at 135-36.
130 Ferejohn, supra note 87, at 354-57.
131 J.Y. Interpretation No. 177 (1982) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=177 [hereinafter
Interpretation No. 177].
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Court continued to review the constitutionality of precedents in a
series of cases. 132 Although disagreements between the two apex
courts were inevitable, they did not escalate to open conflicts.
Open conflict between the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court did not occur until Interpretations No. 530 133 and No.
582. 134 The controversy in the former decision revolved around
whether the judicial system should follow the American model
(where there is one single apex court), favored by the framers, or the
German model (where there are one Supreme Court and one
Constitutional Court), which has been in practice for more than five
decades. The importance of this reform project cannot be overstated
since it will fundamentally alter the structure of the judiciary and
affect the power of the Supreme Court over lower courts and legal
interpretation if successfully implemented. 135
Although the
Constitutional Court ruled clearly in favor of the American model,
the Supreme Court vehemently resisted, 136 and the decision has never
been implemented. It also seems unlikely to be implemented in the
near future.
The latter case, Interpretation No. 582, was arguably the most
serious clash between the two courts. The Constitutional Court
voided two precedents concerning whether or not a co-defendant’s
statement can be used against the other co-defendant without crossexamination. 137 The two precedents held that the statement of a codefendant is equivalent to a confession; thus, it shall be admitted to
trial automatically. 138 By contrast, the Constitutional Court treated a
co-defendant as an independent witness, and maintained that he or
she shall be orally examined by the other co-defendant’s counsel at
trial. 139 Hence, the two precedents were quashed as they violated the
132

These decisions include but not limited to J.Y. Interpretations No. 185, 187, 201, 213,
220, 243, 256, 266, 269, 271, 275, and 306.
133 J.Y. Interpretation No. 530 (2001) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=530 [hereinafter
Interpretation No. 530].
134 J.Y. Interpretation No. 582 (2004) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=582 [hereinafter
Intrepetation No. 582].
135 See Jau-Yuan Hwang (黃昭元), Sifa Weixian Shencha de Zhidu Xuanze yu Sifa Yuan
Dingwei (司法違憲審查的制度選擇與司法院定位), 32 NTU L.J. 55, 65-70 (2003); Lee,
supra note 126, at 239-45.
136 Chang, supra note 125, at 146.
137 Supra note 134.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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due process guaranteed in the Constitution.140 Although this case was
seen as a great stride toward protecting criminal procedural rights, the
Supreme Court was greatly irritated. Soon it held a press conference
and openly expressed strong disagreement by maintaining that
ordinary courts would continue applying the said precedents. 141 The
Supreme Court further criticized that the Constitutional Court
distorted the two voided precedents, hampered criminal law practice,
and encroached upon its jurisdiction. This momentous clash
eventuated in a second Constitutional Court decision, Interpretation
No. 592, 142 which reiterated and clarified the scope and effect of
Interpretation No. 582. The Supreme Court was not fully satisfied,
but did not issue any comments or act further in public.
The two inter-court confrontations in Taiwan demonstrate
how disagreement escalated into conflicts because of information
asymmetry, and that power dynamics shift in a war of courts, as the
Constitutional Court received support from external allies. Both
courts thought the other would swerve, and the mutual
misunderstanding resulted in the head-on clashes.
Specifically, from the perspective of the Constitutional Court,
half of constitutional judges at that time were judges of the Supreme
Court or the Supreme Administrative Court before being appointed
when delivering the two Interpretations. Given their background
serving as career judges and personal connections with former
colleagues on both supreme courts, they should have knowledge
about whether the two Interpretations would trigger resistance, and
would have acted to soften the position of the Constitutional Court
when necessary. Moreover, these constitutional judges could have
easily vetoed any decision they deemed improper or too provocative,
since a supermajority of votes is required to pass any constitutional
decision. In the case of Interpretation No. 530, such behavior did not
take place. Not only did the Constitutional Court issue the decision,
but moreover none of the former Supreme Court judges issued any
dissenting opinion. 143 As for the case of Interpretation No. 582,
140

Id.
See Pi-Hu Hsu, On the Application of Sec. II Art. V, Constitutional Interpretation
Procedure Act 222 TAIWAN L. REV. 133, 137 (2013).
142 J.Y. Interpretation No. 592 (2005) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=592.
143 The only dissenting opinion came from a justice with a scholarly background, who
studied in Austria. J.Y. Interpretation No. 530 (2001) (Taiwan), available at
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=530.
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/3

330

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

former judges of other apex courts including one specializing in
criminal procedure, also agreed with the majority to strike down the
precedents at issue. 144 Given the controversy surrounding this
decision, judges from supreme courts should have vetoed it, or at least
issued dissenting opinions if they found it intolerable. Nonetheless,
only one justice from the Supreme Administrative Court issued a
dissenting opinion. Since most judges had consented, at least
ostensibly, the Constitutional Court was not aware of the severe
resistance from the Supreme Court.
In addition, two years before Interpretation No. 530, the
Judicial Yuan held the National Judicial Reform Convention to
discuss the organizational framework of the judiciary in Taiwan. 145
The American model was widely supported by most participants (99
out of 121), including legal scholars, lawyers, judges, and
representatives from NGOs. 146 In Interpretation No. 530, it seems
reasonable for constitutional judges to assume limited resistance from
the Supreme Court since they simply reconfirmed what had already
been discussed in the convention. 147 A similar situation occurred in
Interpretation No. 582 as well. 148 As discussed earlier, it was not the
first time the Constitutional Court struck down judicial precedents.
The Constitutional Court would not have expected to encounter
unprecedented pushback.
From the perspective of the Supreme Court, on the other hand,
the two constitutional decisions were equally surprising and beyond
what it could tolerate. In Interpretation No. 530, the Constitution
Court tried in vain to fundamentally renovate the judicial system. 149
Given that the current German model has been in practice for about
six decades and functioned properly, the decision was simply
incomprehensible in the eyes of the Supreme Court. Likewise, the
two precedents that were struck down in Interpretation No. 582 had
been invoked repeatedly for more than four and six decades
respectively. 150 Given this legal stability, it is conceivable that the
Supreme Court would not expect these two precedents to be nullified
144

It should be noted that four constitutional judges appointed from ordinary courts
recused themselves in this decision.
145 See Hwang, supra note 135.
146 Id. at 65; but see Tzung-Jen Tsai (蔡宗珍), Woguo Xianfa Shenpan Zhidu zhi Jiantao
(我國憲法審判制度之檢討), 98 TAIWAN L. REV. 49 (2003).
147 Supra note 133.
148 Interpretation No. 582.
149 Supra note 133.
150 Interpretation No. 582.
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and voided. It turned out that both apex courts misjudged, leading to
wars of courts.
In regard to the power dynamics emerging from the two
serious collisions, the availability of alliances indicates the destiny of
the two cases. Interpretation No. 530 has never been implemented,
while Interpretation No. 582 has been gradually accepted despite the
resistance of the Supreme Court at the beginning. A crucial ally was
present in the latter case, but absent in the former one: legal academia.
In Interpretation No. 530, although some consensus had been reached
beforehand in the judicial reform convention, scholarly opinion was
highly divided. 151 Scholars who studied in the United States
supported the decision, while scholars who studied in Germany,
preferring the European model, generally opposed it and stood in
favor of the status quo. 152 Interpretation No. 582, by contrast,
received overwhelming if not unanimous support among criminal law
scholars and NGOs. 153 Given this pressure, it would be difficult for
the Supreme Court to resist for a long time.
Another key ally, politicians, might have also contributed to
success or failure in the two cases. Interpretation No. 530 was an
institutional reform that required political cooperation and
coordination. Therefore, the presence of political allies is especially
crucial. Unfortunately, the interpretation did not garner enough
support from politicians in power because of political gridlock at the
time. 154 The lack of political alignment is a major factor behind the
impasse. In contrast, Interpretation No. 582 did not require active
government involvement. Consequently, its implementation is more
feasible so long as the public led by opinion leaders clearly stands by
the Constitutional Court instead of the Supreme Court.
IV. Normative Implications
Analyses in this paper bring forth normative implications on
three fronts: public interest, power dynamics, and institutional design.
First, an inter-court skirmish may advance the public interest
in the long run for society as a whole, although it may generate no
151

See Hwang, supra note 135.
See Lee, supra note 126, at 243 n.43.
153 See Judicial Reform Foundation, Announcement on Interpretation No. 582,
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/index_new2014.asp?id=469 (last revisited April 10, 2016).
154 See Hwang, supra note 135, at 67 n.26.
152

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol11/iss2/3

332

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA ASIAN LAW REVIEW Vol. 11

institutional good for either apex court. In this sense, such conflict
shall be encouraged. Public interest advanced in this context includes
precedent setting, authority clarification, and human rights protection.
Specifically, in many Latin American, Eastern European, and Asian
young democracies (most of which are civil law countries with
multiple apex courts), governments have enacted amnesty law to
grant immunity to former high-rank officers in exchange for
bloodless political transition. After democratization, nonetheless,
victims of past human rights violations usually try to repeal the
relevant law in the pursuit of justice. Facing this moral predicament,
supreme courts tend to recognize amnesty law since they are
generally legalistic and conservative, 155 while constitutional courts
tend to focus more on human rights protection and substantive justice.
Inter-court conflicts arising in this context actually serve the public
interest by clarifying the legal character of transitional justice. That
is, a society will be better off in the long run if the thorny issues of
restorative justice can be solved as clearly (and perhaps early) as
possible. Another good example is the debate over the death penalty.
Capital punishment, whose character is both criminal and
constitutional, has often resulted in a split between the supreme court
and the constitutional court in European countries. Being an
extremely divisive issue that repeatedly sparks controversy, this is an
issue that needs to be fully debated and properly tackled. An intercourt conflict at an early stage may spur in-depth deliberation and
help reach a precedent that stabilizes the system in the long-term
despite its short-term costs. Note that the benefit of precedent-setting
may be particularly enduring in the judicial sphere not only because
the doctrine of stare decisis is in effect prevalent in every judicial
system, but also because of the nature of constitutional interpretation:
the constitution is what constitutional judges say it is to paraphrase
Chief Justice Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court. 156 Admittedly,
without enough information, a premature conflict may simply
establish unnecessary or even problematic precedents. 157 Whether
this is the case, however, is case-specific and beyond the scope of this
paper. The point here is that an inter-court clash may be positive to
society, advancing public good in the long run.
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Second, in terms of shifting power equilibrium, an inter-court
conflict may lead to new dynamics between apex courts. Supreme
courts seem to have gradually lost their supremacy in the domain of
civil, criminal, and administrative laws. By contrast, constitutional
courts would essentially become the “appellate court” of supreme
courts if ambitious enough. To be sure, this depends on how
constitutional courts exercise their judicial review power against
supreme courts. One crucial constraint is the size of the docket, as
constitutional courts review much fewer petitions and cases than
supreme courts. Nevertheless, to be a “super supreme court,” a
constitutional court need not overrule many decisions issued by a
supreme court, but rather only the critical ones. As long as a supreme
court is overshadowed by the risk of “being reversed,” however small
the likelihood of this is, the pressure becomes real. Moreover,
another type of power dynamic, the “boomerang effect” or “pingpong effect,” 158 has emerged between constitutional courts and
supreme courts. Petitioners frustrated by supreme courts may bring
their cases to constitutional courts, and once they win in
constitutional courts, they usually can go back to supreme courts and
ask for another review.
Third, a war of courts may also reshape the power dynamics
between the judiciary and the political branches, as well as between
different political parties. As suggested in the previous analysis,
support from external actors, particularly the political branches, is
pivotal in a war of courts. This collision and alignment actually has
a reinforcing effect on the relationship between law and politics.
Issues over which courts fight publicly are usually of paramount
political salience, since doing so entails great costs for both apex
courts. Once the debate takes place at the judicial arena, it attracts
public attention and puts the issues into the political agenda, thus
creating incentives for politicians to be involved in the war of courts.
Political parties with divergent views might align with different
courts in the hope of increasing popular support. Various approaches
are available to popularity-seeking politicians, such as revising
related statutes or even constitutional provisions, or openly
supporting or refusing future implementation of the court’s decision.
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These political moves may result in more political turmoil or expand
the power of a court at the expense of the other, such as the case in
France and Poland. In short, the dynamic interaction between
politicians and courts demonstrates how inter-court conflict may
translate into power struggle, not only in the judiciary, but the
political sphere.
Finally, from the perspective of constitutional stability, the
representation model may be the best mechanism to appoint
constitutional judges since it reduces inter-court conflicts most
effectively by guaranteeing that constitutional courts include some
former judges of supreme courts. Namely, all things being equal, the
representation model best diversifies the composition of
constitutional courts both in terms of ideology and personnel. This
not only makes their opinions more moderate, but also renders
constitutional courts better able to predict the reaction of the other
three branches—a design that may contribute to constitutional
stability. Of course, benefits brought by inter-court (or even interbranch) conflicts may be prevented as well, such as with the
aforementioned function of authority clarification. Future framers
need to reckon with the issue of how to strike a middle ground that
spurs interest-enhancing confrontations and discourages those that
result only in judicial chaos.
V.

Conclusion

Judicial disagreements result from a variety of reasons, but it
is information asymmetry between apex courts that explains why
some disagreements escalate to open conflicts but not others. In
essence, a head-on collision takes place when both apex courts
miscalculate the other’s strategy since a confrontation may entail
great institutional costs to both courts, including the loss of public
support and judicial power. Once a war of courts occurs, which court
prevails does not necessarily depend on whose legal interpretation is
better but rather hinges on who can successfully forge an alliance
with other actors, such as lower courts, the academia, or politicians
in power. The case of Taiwan, along with Colombia, France, Poland,
and many other countries, vividly demonstrates this point: whoever
secured external support won the war of courts. Despite some shortterm costs, a judicial showdown between apex courts can generate
public good. In certain contexts, a public confrontation that spawns
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judicial chaos may even lead to greater constitutional stability in the
long run.
Furthermore, this paper concentrates on the interaction
between constitutional courts and supreme courts. Obviously, there
are other types of inter-court conflicts, such as the wars between
administrative courts and constitutional courts, between secular
courts and religious courts, 159 and between regional courts and
domestic courts. 160 What motivates these conflicts and what these
conflicts may bring about remain largely unclear. It is plausible that
studies on these inter-judiciary conflicts may shed new light on
current theories of separation of powers, separation of church and
state, and the domestic, regional, and global judicialization of politics.
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